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ABSTRACT 
The 2011 decision by the Federal Circuit in Uniloc v. 
Microsoft properly condemned the “25% Rule,” which bases 
a reasonable royalty on 25% of an infringer’s profits.  
Nonetheless, at least one proponent of the Rule continues to 
argue that the Rule is fundamentally valid and should remain 
in use. 
This article analyzes the historical development of the 
Rule, its conceptual basis, its application in actual cases, and 
relevant insights from other recent Federal Circuit cases.  
Each analysis shows fundamental problems and 
contradictions that demonstrate the Rule can never be a 
reliable patent damages methodology.  There is no reason to 
change the conclusion in Uniloc.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Rarely does a U.S. court express an opinion on the intrinsic 
merit of a particular methodology for calculating damages in patent 
infringement litigation.  But in the wake of several very large patent 
damages awards with questionable bases in economics and the law, a 
series of Federal Circuit decisions has started to place greater limits 
on damages theories.2  In Uniloc v. Microsoft, one of the most 
important of these decisions, the Federal Circuit took special aim at 
the “25% Rule,” under which 25% of the infringer’s profits is the 
baseline determinant for reasonable royalty damages.3  The court 
condemned this methodology as “fundamentally flawed” and warned 
that evidence based on the Rule in the future will be “inadmissible 
                                                
1 Adjunct Professor of Finance, Boston College.  The author may be reached at 
rje@royepstein.com. The author is indebted to Fred Knapp, Paul Malherbe, and 
the editors for valuable comments. 
2 Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009), initiated this 
development.  In Lucent, the Federal Circuit vacated a jury award of $358 
million for an infringing feature in Microsoft Outlook software. 
3 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence.”4  The Federal 
Circuit later denied a combined petition for panel rehearing and 
rehearing en banc. 
¶2 Given the Rule’s tendency to yield a high starting point for a 
reasonable royalty determination, a plaintiff’s damages expert may 
yet seek to rehabilitate it for a future case despite the stern language 
in Uniloc.  One main proponent of the Rule claims the Federal Circuit 
was “misled” and that its ruling is “dangerous and unnecessary.”5  
This advocate attempts to distinguish a valid “classic 25% Rule” from 
an invalid “25% Rule of Thumb,” and asserts the “classic 25% Rule” 
should remain an admissible methodology after all.6   
¶3 The purpose of this article is to review the economic basis for 
the 25% Rule, taking into account the proposed distinction between 
the “classic” and “rule of thumb” formulations.  The analysis 
combines insights from Uniloc and other notable cases, as well as a 
review of historical licensing literature, principles of economics and 
accounting, empirical studies of royalty rates, and reviews of actual 
licenses.  Conflicting applications of the “classic” 25% Rule in case 
law show the methodology flouts basic expectations for reliability.  
The “classic” Rule is incapable of rehabilitation and the bar against 
using it should stand without qualification. 
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE 25% RULE 
¶4 The 25% Rule originated as a 5% running royalty negotiated 
in the 1950s by Robert Goldscheider on behalf of Philco, which, at 
the time, manufactured televisions and other appliances.  The royalty 
covered a portfolio of exclusive patent rights, trade secrets, 
trademarks, copyrights, and other intellectual property rights.7  Mr. 
Goldscheider compared the 5% running royalty in this arrangement to 
the pre-tax profit rate of approximately 20% for Philco licensees and 
calculated that the royalty constituted about 25% of the pre-tax 
                                                
4 Id.; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 589 (1993); FED. R. 
EVID. 103(a).  Daubert sets out criteria for admissibility of expert witness 
testimony. 
5 Robert Goldscheider, The Classic 25% Rule and the Art of Intellectual 
Property Licensing, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 6, ¶¶ 4, 12. 
6 Id. ¶ 57. 
7 Id. ¶ 18.  The territorial exclusivity is described in Robert Goldscheider et al., 
Use of the 25 Per Cent Rule in Valuing IP, 37 LES NOUVELLES 123 (2002) 
[hereinafter Valuing IP]. 
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profits.8  Mr. Goldscheider first wrote about using this rate as a 
royalty methodology in 1971, referring to it as a “rule of thumb.”9  In 
subsequent articles, he explained the Rule’s two prongs: first 
assuming a reasonable royalty equal to 25% of the infringer’s pre-tax 
profit rate, and then “tuning” the figure up or down according to the 
Georgia-Pacific factors10 and a host of other considerations.11 
¶5 The Philco case itself highlights the basic problem with the 
Rule.  To meet the requirement of general applicability, a patent 
damages methodology must be able to value a single patent that is 
naked (i.e., not bundled with other rights) and non-exclusive.  But the 
Philco license is far more complex.  The deal involved a portfolio of 
patents, with valuations complicated by exclusivity and other non-
patent assets.  The Philco example sheds no light on what proportion 
of the negotiated royalty was attributable to the patents as opposed to 
other rights conveyed.  Nor does it indicate a specific value for any 
individual patent in the portfolio.  The only definite conclusion is that 
the naked, non-exclusive value of any Philco patent at issue must 
have been only a fraction of the 5% royalty.  Ironically, in an 
example intended to highlight the validity of the 25% Rule, the 
methodology fails to provide reliable information on the value of any 
patent and overstates the value of the entire patent portfolio by an 
unknown amount.  
¶6 Earlier professional licensing literature described royalty 
scenarios analogous to assigning 25% of a licensee’s expected profit 
as a royalty, but only in a limited set of circumstances.  For example, 
one observer estimated possible royalties may fall between 10% and 
20% of profits when the patent is for something tangible, profitable, 
and economically strong.  Royalties may reach up to 30% of profits 
when an invention is “the vital element” in a manufactured product.12  
                                                
8 Goldscheider, supra note 5, ¶ 20. 
9 Robert Goldscheider & James T. Marshall, The Art of Licensing – From the 
Consultant’s Point of View, 6 LES NOUVELLES 166 (1971), reprinted in THE 
LAW AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING 652 (Marcus Finnegan & Robert 
Goldscheider eds., 1980). 
10 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).   
11 Robert Goldscheider, Litigation Backgrounder for Licensing, 29 LES 
NOUVELLES 20, 25 (1994); Valuing IP, supra note 7, at 132. 
12 Archie M. Palmer et al., The Making and Application of Royalty Rates, in 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENT LICENSING 69 (Albert S. Davis, Jr. ed., 
1958). 
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On this spectrum, a reasonable royalty based on a 25% split would 
require not just a strong patent, but a “vital” patent. 
¶7 Another observer suggested “the licensor is not entitled to 
more than about twenty to twenty-five percent of the estimated 
profits” and a 5% running royalty on sales was “just about tops for a 
very fine situation.”13  The implication is that the 25% share of profit 
is close to the upper bound for a royalty and would be a greatly 
biased measure of the value of most patents. 
¶8 In a 2002 article, Mr. Goldscheider claimed broader empirical 
support for the presumption of a 25% profit split for patent licenses.  
He indicated that he reviewed royalty rates in thousands of licensing 
transactions from the late 1980s and onward, finding a wide range of 
rates.  In fact, he reported royalty rates ranging from 0% of sales to 
77% of sales.  He then collected rough data on company profits as a 
percentage of sales.  After excluding as much as three quarters of the 
profit data for various reasons, he calculated an overall median profit 
split of 22.6%.14  Although this procedure raised numerous economic 
and statistical red flags, Mr. Goldscheider asserted “the data support 
the Rule generally.”15  To reinforce his claim that splits in this range 
are representative of reasonable royalties, he also cited commentators 
for the propositions that “most successful licensing arrangements end 
with royalty levels in this range [of 1/4 to 1/3 of the licensee’s 
anticipated profit]”16 and that a 25/75 split is “the industry norm.”17 
¶9 A default royalty equal to 25% of the infringer’s profit would 
have major implications for litigation.  Such an assumption could 
sway triers of fact toward awarding extremely high damages because 
it suggests that, “on average,” such a profit split would be an 
empirically validated decision.  Even as a starting point, there is a 
substantial risk that subsequent “tuning” would fail to achieve an 
appropriate adjustment. 
                                                
13 George S. Hastings, Royalty Bases from Licensor’s Viewpoint, in PRACTISING 
LAW INSTITUTE, PRACTICAL PATENT LICENSING 78 (Albert S. Davis, Jr. ed., 
1966).  
14 Valuing IP, supra note 7, at 133. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 132 (emphasis added). 
17 Id. at 130 (emphasis added). 
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¶10 A recent article presented an in-depth analysis of Mr. 
Goldscheider’s empirical study.18  A central problem is that his data 
included all sorts of intellectual property transactions that did not 
belong in the analysis.  The reported royalties in many cases bundled 
patent rights with other types of intellectual property, such as 
copyrights, as well as different exclusivity provisions.19  The patent 
royalty rates were also frequently attributable to multiple patents and 
even large portfolios of patents.20  Each of these factors indicates the 
data are irrelevant, misleading, or too biased for determining a 
reasonable royalty for a single, non-exclusive, naked patent. 
¶11 Indeed, the vast majority of royalty rates (over 80%) in the 
database used by Mr. Goldscheider were essentially bare numbers 
with no description of the licensed intellectual property.21  
Conclusions based on such data are inadmissible, according to the 
Federal Circuit’s ruling in Lucent Technologies v. Gateway, Inc.,22 
which repeatedly underscores a requirement to prove benchmark 
royalties are comparable to those for the patent at issue by using 
economically meaningful criteria.  Mr. Goldscheider’s sole control 
for comparability was to group licenses according to rough industry 
categories such as “consumer goods.”  The Lucent decision 
recognizes, however, the mere fact that another license was 
negotiated in the same general industry provides virtually no 
information on the comparability of the royalty rate.23 
¶12 Nearly all of the license rates associated with patents in Mr. 
Goldscheider’s database would require significant adjustments to be 
minimally comparable for calculating damages.  For example, a 
licensing agreement between NCT Group, Inc. and Stopnoise, Inc. set 
                                                
18 Roy J. Epstein & Paul Malherbe, Reasonable Royalty Patent Infringement 
Damages After Uniloc, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 3 (2011). 
19 Many agreements, involving transfers of computer technology for example, 
did not involve patents at all.  Other royalties referred to balancing payments in 
cross-licensing transactions and royalties for technologies where patents had not 
yet issued.   
20 Epstein & Malherbe, supra note 18, at 17. 
21 Id. at 18. 
22 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
23 Id. at 1328. 
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a royalty of 5%, but this rate covered rights to thirty-five U.S. 
patents.24 
¶13 The royalty rates in the data, even when relevant to patent 
licenses, were likely biased upward.  The database only included 
information reported in publicly available sources, the most important 
of which were SEC filings.  However, these filings generally disclose 
an individual transaction only when it is large enough to be material 
to the company’s overall financial position.  Accordingly, the 
database did not include a representative number of transactions 
involving lower-value licenses.  This consideration, combined with 
the high incidence of exclusive, non-naked, and/or multiple patents, 
strongly suggests the data were biased upward relative to the universe 
of all patent royalties. 
¶14 A reasonable royalty equal to 25% of the licensee’s profits 
might apply to a small number of patents that involve a vital and 
commercially important technology.  But even in such cases, the rate 
should be proven reasonable using independent evidence and should 
not merely be assumed reasonable.  There is no valid basis for Mr. 
Goldscheider’s claim of empirical support for an average royalty on 
the order of 25% of profits.  
II. TUNING AND THE 25% RULE 
¶15 Mr. Goldscheider has often advocated the 25% split as a 
“starting point” for a reasonable royalty that should be “tuned” 
depending on the circumstances of a given case.25  Mr. Goldscheider 
suggests this tuning adjustment, based on the application of the 
Georgia-Pacific factors or other factors the damages expert deems 
relevant, distinguishes his “classic” 25% Rule from the inadmissible 
“rule of thumb” he claims was the focus in Uniloc.26 
¶16 However, this forced distinction lacks historical support.  In 
reality, tuning has been the norm in cases using the 25% Rule to 
determine a reasonable royalty—Uniloc was no exception.  Mr. 
Goldscheider suggests that Joseph Gemini, Uniloc’s damages expert, 
                                                
24    See License Agreement between NCT Group, Inc. and Stopnoise, Inc. (Jan. 6, 
2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/722051/000072205103000014/exh-
10aj.txt.  
25 Valuing IP, supra note 7, at 127. 
26 Goldscheider, supra note 5, ¶13. 
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simply calculated a “wooden” 25% split in accordance with the “rule 
of thumb.”27  But the Federal Circuit emphasized that Mr. Gemini 
based his opinion on a hypothetical negotiation incorporating the 
Georgia-Pacific factors as modifiers to the split.28  The Uniloc 
decision therefore considered and rejected the very tuning 
methodology that Mr. Goldscheider continues to advocate as the 
“classic” Rule.   
¶17 As the Uniloc decision carefully explained, Mr. Gemini 
testified his procedure was “‘to adjust this 25% up or down’” 
depending on his consideration of the Georgia-Pacific factors.29  In 
this case, Mr. Gemini simply concluded the factors in favor of Uniloc 
and Microsoft respectively were equally balanced and did not change 
the 25% starting point.30  The result was a damages claim of $565 
million.31  Regarding the basis for assuming Microsoft would have 
used such a starting point in a hypothetical negotiation, Mr. Gemini 
testified, “It’s a widely accepted rule.”32  The Federal Circuit found 
Mr. Gemini’s starting point bore no relation to the facts of the case, 
and was therefore “arbitrary, unreliable, and irrelevant.”33 
¶18 The Uniloc decision further stated “it is of no moment that the 
25 percent rule of thumb is offered merely as a starting point.”34  The 
decision reasoned that “[b]eginning from a fundamentally flawed 
premise . . . results in a fundamentally flawed conclusion.”35  
Notably, Mr. Goldscheider’s effort to rehabilitate his notion of a 
“classic” 25% Rule does not address any of the searching criticisms 
the Federal Circuit specifically directed against it. 
¶19 Georgia-Pacific and many other cases illustrate the use of 
rates from other licenses to determine a reasonable royalty for the 
patent in suit.  Such an analysis may even be the most common patent 
damages methodology.  In this context, the 25% Rule might be 
viewed charitably as a “surrogate” license to provide a benchmark 
royalty rate when no actual license can be identified for this purpose.  
                                                
27 Id. ¶ 9. 
28 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1311–12. 
29 Id. at 1311. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 1318. 
34 Id. at 1317. 
35 Id. 
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But the Federal Circuit’s decision in Lucent emphasized the need for 
close scrutiny of “comparable” licenses used as benchmarks to avoid 
erroneous results.36  In ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit vacated a patent damages award primarily because there was 
no “discernible link” between the claimed technology and the 
majority of the licenses considered by the plaintiff’s expert.37  
Moreover, the expert relied on royalty rates from licenses that 
conveyed rights to substantial amounts of non-patent property, 
including software, which undermined the usefulness of such licenses 
as benchmarks.  Even if the 25% Rule were simply viewed as another 
license benchmark, the implication of both Lucent and ResQNet is 
that a plaintiff would have to demonstrate the relevance of such a 
benchmark and not simply assume it.  Mr. Gemini’s justification for 
his use of the 25% Rule, for example, skirts this basic requirement. 
¶20 It is not clear, however, whether one could ever reconcile the 
25% Rule with Lucent.  The benchmark royalty in a comparable 
license can be rationally adjusted for the patent in suit only if the 
provisions of the license are known, but such an adjustment is not 
possible under the Rule.  According to Lucent, one would have to 
ascertain the subject matter of the license agreements that supposedly 
justify the use of the Rule and also assess whether the patents covered 
by those other agreements are in any way similar to the patent in 
suit.38  Mr. Gemini’s inability to point to a comparable royalty rate 
while using the 25% Rule illustrates the problem.  To the author’s 
knowledge, the details of actual license agreements have never been 
presented in litigated cases to scrutinize the comparability of a royalty 
benchmark based on the 25% Rule.  Without factual support of this 
nature, the 25% rate, even as a starting point, is little more than “the 
ipse dixit of the expert” that was rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Kumho Tire.39 
¶21 The “tuning” argument also fails to justify the “classic” 25% 
Rule as a matter of basic logic.  It presumes that making adjustments 
to an economically arbitrary starting point leads to a valid endpoint.  
But if the valid endpoint is truly known, one could just as well use 
another starting point, such as 10% of profits or even zero, and apply 
                                                
36  Lucent Techs. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
37    594 F.3d 860, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
38 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1327–1329. 
39 Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 157 (1999). 
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the corresponding adjustments.  The starting point therefore is an 
irrelevant detour.  The damages expert should focus directly on the 
ultimate conclusion and show its validity.  The only certainty the 25% 
Rule provides is to ensure a high starting point, with no assurance 
that the balance of the analysis will yield an accurate damages figure. 
III. PROFITS AND THE 25% RULE 
¶22 In addition to the problems identified in Uniloc, the 25% Rule 
fails to provide a clear and economically consistent definition of the 
total profits to be apportioned.  The relevant case law shows 
fundamentally conflicting applications of the Rule in this regard.40  
Because the 25% Rule proffers no reasoned basis for selecting one 
profit basis over another, the Rule is far more arbitrary than even its 
critics generally recognize. 
¶23 There are many different profit concepts in accounting and 
economics.  For example, gross profit is equal to revenue minus cost 
of goods sold without accounting for any overhead expenses.  
Operating profit is equal to gross profit less overheads such as selling, 
general, and administrative (SGA) expenses. There are still other 
profit measures, such as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA).  One study showed that using these alternative standard 
definitions of profit with the 25% Rule could swing the resulting 
royalty rate by a factor of four or more—an extremely high margin of 
error.41 
¶24 Proponents of the 25% Rule have never agreed on which 
measure of profit to use.  Robert Goldscheider first used 25% of gross 
profits.42  However, he later adopted operating profits and rejected the 
use of gross profits as “specious.”43  Russell Parr described the Rule 
as using gross profits, but has also stated “the only appropriate 
                                                
40 In i4i v. Microsoft, the Rule was implemented using a gross profit rate.  In 
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., another case involving the 25% Rule, the 
plaintiff’s expert selected the infringer’s operating profit.  In Procter & Gamble 
Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., the infringer had a gross profitability of 
22.39% and a net profit margin of approximately 7%.    
41 Jonathan E. Kemmerer & Jiaqing Lu, Profitability and Royalty Rates Across 
Industries: Some Preliminary Evidence, 8 J. Acad. Bus. & Econ. 68, tbl.1 
(2008). 
42 Goldscheider & Marshall, supra note 9, at 652. 
43 Valuing IP, supra note 7, at 131. 
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application of the rule is in terms of operating profits.”44  Richard 
Razgaitis argued the 25% Rule applies to the incremental profit 
attributable to the patented invention.45  Jonathan Kemmerer and 
Jiaqing Lu argue for the use of EBITDA.46  William Lee explained 
his use of the Rule in terms of the licensee’s “anticipated” profit, 
without referring to a specific accounting definition.47  
¶25 This methodological chaos has critical implications for 
determining a reasonable royalty.  i4i v. Microsoft, resulting in a $200 
million jury award, provides a vivid example.48  The infringing 
products involved versions of Microsoft Word in Office Professional 
2003 and 2007 sold to businesses.49  The plaintiff’s expert, Michael 
Wagner, used the 25% Rule, characterizing it as “well-recognized” 
and “widely used.”50  He defined profits for use with the Rule as 
76.6% of the assumed infringing sales.  This rate is evidently based 
on gross profits or something similar⎯Microsoft had an overall gross 
profit of approximately 80% during the claimed damages period.  
Multiplying 76.6% by the claimed value of the sales, at a 25% rate, 
yielded a starting point of $96 per unit for the claimed royalty.51  The 
expert then employed a tuning procedure using the Georgia-Pacific 
factors.52  Mr. Wagner made an upward adjustment from the 25% 
baseline, which increased the royalty to $98 per unit, so that the total 
claimed damages was $200 million when applied to the infringing 
sales. 
¶26 Mr. Goldscheider, however, has written, “[T]he rule is not a 
split of gross profits.”53  Instead, he asserted the Rule should use 
operating profits after fully loading all operating expenses.54  He 
explained that gross profits should be adjusted by allocating common 
                                                
44 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAMAGES at 169 (Russell L. Parr ed., 1993); Civix 
v. Expedia, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45948 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2005).   
45 RICHARD RAZGAITIS, EARLY-STAGE TECHNOLOGIES: VALUATION AND 
PRICING 98 (1999). 
46 Kemmerer & Lu, supra note 41, at 78. 
47 WILLIAM MARSHALL LEE, DETERMINING REASONABLE ROYALTY 127 (1992). 
48 i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  The author 
of this article was not involved in i4i.   
49 Id. at 840. 
50 Id. at 853. 
51 Id. at 853. 
52 Id. 
53 Valuing IP, supra at 7, at 131 (emphasis in original). 
54 Id. at 125. 
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(or non-manufacturing overhead) costs to the product line to derive 
operating profits.55  Operating income for Microsoft during the 
claimed damages period was approximately 35% of revenue.   
Compared to the approach based on gross profits, using operating 
income would cut the royalty generated by the 25% Rule by more 
than half, reducing the claimed damages from $200 million to under 
$100 million. 
¶27 Indeed, Mr. Wagner employed a new version of the 25% Rule 
in i4i that lacked any basis whatsoever in economics or the terms of 
actual licenses.  First, he defined profit based on revenues that 
Microsoft never made.  Further, he assumed an average price of $499 
for the units in the royalty base.56  However, this price was the list 
price of a non-Microsoft product called XMetaL.57  Microsoft’s 
expert testified this price was two times the price at which Word 2003 
was actually sold.58  Thus, the profits Mr. Wagner used to calculate 
the royalty with the 25% Rule were purely imaginary. 
¶28 Mr. Wagner jointly wrote an article in 2010 with the co-
authors of the 2002 Goldscheider study (which described the use of 
gross profit as “specious”).59  Remarkably, even though the joint 
article contained a section titled “Proper Understanding of the [25%] 
Rule,” that discussion did not address the critical importance of 
defining a profit measure.  The 25% Rule suffers from an 
extraordinary lack of ground rules that has allowed experts to adopt 
radically inconsistent damages methodologies under the guise of one 
common approach. 
                                                
55 Id. at 126. 
56 i4i, 598 F.3d at 853. 
57 Id.  Mr. Wagner argued that sales of the non-Microsoft product provided 
relevant evidence for his use of the 25% Rule.  For further discussion of 
economic contradictions in his damages theory, see Epstein & Malherbe, supra 
note 18, at 30.  
58 Transcript of Trial at 84, i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 
568 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 6:07CV113), available at 
http://www.i4ilp.com/court/transcripts/May%2019,%202009-
%20Morning%20Session.pdf. 
59 John C. Jarosz, Carla Mulhern & Michael Wagner, The 25% Rule Lives On, 
LAW360.COM (Aug. 25, 2010), 
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/News_and_Events/News/Law360
_Sept2010_The_25_Percent_Rule_Lives_On.pdf.   
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IV. THE 25% RULE AND THE ENTIRE MARKET VALUE RULE 
¶29 The legal principle known as the “entire market value” rule 
further diminishes the relevance of the 25% Rule for measuring 
patent infringement damages.  The entire market value rule holds that 
damages may be based on the value of the entire assembly when (a) a 
product consists of unpatented components together with a patented 
component; and (b) the sale of the entire assembly depends on a 
patented invention embodied in it.60  The unpatented components 
must function together with the patented component as if they were 
all components of a single assembly used to produce a desired 
result.61  For the entire market value rule to apply, the patentee must 
prove “the patent-related feature is the ‘basis for customer 
demand.’”62  If so, the royalty base may then include the value of the 
entire assembly and not just that of the patented component. 
¶30 When the entire market value rule does not apply, it would be 
erroneous to assume a relationship between the profits (however 
defined) from selling the product and the value of an invention that 
may form merely a component of the product.  The Federal Circuit 
decisions in Lucent and Uniloc discussed this issue extensively.  For 
example, the infringement in Lucent concerned a “date picker” 
feature in the calendar included in Microsoft Outlook.  The plaintiff’s 
expert claimed an 8% royalty on all of Microsoft’s sales of Outlook 
software, which amounted to $562 million.63  But the Federal Circuit 
held the date picker was “a tiny feature” and it was “inconceivable” 
that the value of the date picker was a substantial portion of the value 
of Outlook.64 
¶31 The “classic” 25% Rule described by Mr. Goldscheider is a 
split of the total profits generated by the product.  But as Lucent 
explained at length, the justification for basing a reasonable royalty 
on the entire volume of profits for the patent at issue must be proven 
using case-specific evidence.65  The 25% Rule provides no guidance 
or useful information for this critical aspect of a damages analysis.  
                                                
60 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
61 Id. at 1550. 
62 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1549). 
63 Id. at 1323. 
64 Id. at 1332. 
65 Id. at 1337. 
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CONCLUSION 
¶32 The 25% Rule has no reasonable grounding in economics.  
Instead, it appears to have emerged as a negotiating tactic, 
particularly for strong patents outside of the typical non-exclusive 
and naked licensing scenario for patent damages analysis.  The chief 
example used to illustrate the Rule—the Philco licenses from the 
1950s—detracts from the Rule’s soundness as the intellectual 
property rights at issue were not at all comparable to those in most 
patent cases.  The agreed-upon royalty covered a portfolio of patents, 
provided territorial exclusivity, and conveyed many other non-patent 
rights.  
¶33 It is a misnomer even to speak of a 25% “rule” because there 
is no consensus on how that rule is defined.  One of the biggest 
questions remains the definition of the profit to be apportioned in the 
calculation of damages.  Practitioners have used measures ranging 
from the infringer’s gross profit to operating income, and damages 
calculations involving these different measures can vary by a factor 
of two or more.  In i4i v. Microsoft, the Rule was even applied to a 
share of hypothetical profits on a product Microsoft never sold. 
¶34 The 25% Rule essentially relies on little more than a sweeping 
assumption about what a royalty rate should be.  It provides a high 
starting point for a royalty that is clearly inappropriate for many or 
most patents.  The use of total profit for calculating a royalty further 
aggravates the bias because the entire market value likely applies in 
only a small minority of patent cases. 
¶35 The Rule cannot qualify as a damages methodology because 
even its most vigorous proponents present it merely as a “starting 
point” for some other calculation that is supposed to lead to a correct 
damages figure.66  By structuring a damages analysis in this way, the 
25% Rule imposes an unnecessary and arbitrary detour that does not 
create a reliable end result.  The damages expert should present a 
coherent economic analysis grounded in actual case facts and data, 
where reliability is assessed using statistics, valid royalty 
benchmarks, and other empirical tools. 
¶36 A long line of cases—including Polaroid v. Kodak, TWM v. 
Dura, Panduit, and Georgia-Pacific—shows how reasonable 
royalties can be determined by fact-based analyses when no 
                                                
66 Valuing IP, supra note 7, at 132.  
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established royalties are available.67  The 25% Rule was not used in 
those cases and would not have improved the accuracy of the 
eventual outcomes. 
¶37 The Uniloc court properly held the 25% Rule is arbitrary, 
unreliable, and inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.68  The Federal Circuit considered and expressly rejected a 
damages methodology that used the 25% Rule as a starting point to 
be followed by adjustments based on the Georgia-Pacific factors or 
other factors.  Nonetheless, Mr. Goldscheider continues to advocate 
this approach with his notion of a “classic” 25% Rule.  Nothing in his 
argument addresses the grievous deficiencies of the rule identified in 
Uniloc and discussed in this article.  The “classic” 25% Rule, were it 
to be permitted in expert testimony, would greatly increase the 
potential for biased and unreliable damage awards in patent litigation. 
                                                
67 See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (D. 
Mass. Oct. 12, 1990); TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 895 
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 
1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 
F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).  
68 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
